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Abstract	
Despite the abundance of studies exposing heuristic and biased thinking in judicial decision-
making the influence of this empirical work in court is limited. In this commentary, we address
this paradox and argue that the disconnect between empirical work and practice stems from the
limited knowledge and consideration of procedural rules. These shortcomings increase the
skepticism of legal scholars and practitioners of this research and give an excuse for dismissing
the findings, deeming them inapplicable in court. We suggest that the only way forward is by
diversifying our research methods and by building a culture of collaboration, fostering research
partnerships between legal scholars and (legal) decision-making researchers. This approach
aims to bridge the gap between legal and social sciences and to promote the impact of empirical
studies of the legal system on current legal practice.
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Introduction	
The years following the seminal work of
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on bounded
rationality, saw an upsurge in studies exposing
heuristic and biased thinking in judicial
decision-making (see Rachlinski & Wistrich,
2017). Knowledge about the fact that judicial
judgment is not and cannot be fully rational,
and that heuristics and biases influence judicial
decision-making, can slowly but surely be
counted as general knowledge of lawyers
(Carson, Milne, Pakes, Shalev, & Shawyer, 2007;
Keulen & Knigge, 2016). Yet the influence of
this empirical work in day-to-day court
decisions is limited. With the possible
exception of sentencing decisions in England
and Wales (i.e., adaptation of sentencing
guidelines on the basis of cognitive psychology
findings; Dhami, Belton & Goodman-Delahunty,
2015), and the changes in the application of
juvenile criminal law from 18 years of age to
early 20’s in the Netherlands and Germany, the
results from legal psychological experiments in
decision making rarely change the working
mechanism of the criminal justice system. The
legal reforms concerning judicial and
prosecutorial decision-making are
disproportional to the amount of empirical
studies calling for a change.
In this commentary, we address this paradox
and argue that the disconnect between
empirical work and practice stems primarily
from the limited consideration of procedural
rules in the empirical studies. These
shortcomings increase the skepticism of legal
scholars and practitioners of this research
and give an excuse for dismissing the findings,
deeming them inapplicable in court settings.
The	judge	as	a	procedural	decision-maker	
While everyday judgment is usually free of
form, national criminal procedural law forces
the court to observe certain formal rules
before, during and after trial. Therefore,
judicial decision-making is an interplay
between human judgment (and all heuristics
and biases that may apply) and procedural	
frameworks. It is this interaction between
procedural law and human judgment that is
characteristic of judicial decision-making (for
similar approach see work of Sunstein, Thaler
and Balz (2013) on choice architecture).
However, the majority of experimental
studies on judicial decisions address the
human aspect in a vacuum, stripped from its
procedural context. While this approach
regularly yields interesting findings (for brief
overview see Peer & Gamliel, 2013), it leaves
unexposed that judges do not take a form-free
decision. Dutch judges, for example, are
dependent on the prosecutor because they
can only judge on the charges formulated in
the indictment. The criteria by which these
charges can be considered proven are also
embedded in a strict procedural framework,
known as the law of evidence. The judge can
convict a suspect only when certain rules
have been complied with, such as the
requirement of corroboration (unus	 testis,	
nullus	testis). Procedural rules govern judicial
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fact-finding and decision-making, and this
holds true for all legal systems.
Research today has done little to address the
impact of procedural rules on judicial
decisions. For example, most studies on
anchoring bias vary either the size of the
anchor or its presence (e.g., Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, 2001; McAuliff &
Bornstein, 2010). However, the court cannot
be anchor free when discussing sentencing or
litigation cases. For a criminal procedure (in
continental Europe), the Criminal Procedural
Law requires that the prosecutor makes a
sentencing suggestion, in line with the
sentence directions of the national Criminal
Code. In response, the defense can ask inter	
alia for another modality (community
services instead of imprisonment), a lower
sentence or probation. Experiments aimed to
manipulate procedural rules governing these
anchors should consider anchor updating or
the time interval between the anchors and the
ruling. This is an essential substantive
shortcoming and a strong point of criticism by
legal professionals who argue that legal
strategies and rules can help legal decision
makers reduce their bounded rationality (i.e.,
“debiasing through law”; Jolls & Sunstein,
2005). Indeed, recent studies suggest that
procedural rules can act as debiasing
techniques (Pina-Sanchez & Linacre, 2014).
Yet, the dearth of research on the
effectiveness of procedural rules as debiasing
techniques bolsters the belief in normative
legal decision models and may serve as an
excuse for legal professionals not to
appreciate the significance of the scientific
findings. Interestingly, the nomothetic
perspective of most psychological studies
may further reinforce the depreciation of
scientific findings. Most studies rely on
aggregated group data which opens the
window to the relativist fallacy (i.e., belief
that something is true for the average person
but not for one’s self) and to bias blind spot
(i.e., failing to see the impact of bias on one
own judgment; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002).
The omission of procedural rules can also be
seen as a methodological shortcoming. The
design of many studies on judicial decision-
making overlooks the court’s bureaucratic
setting and the constraint of legal precedent
(Vidmar,  2011).  It  is  set  solely  in  view  of
psychological theories; not of legal
proceedings and therefore fails to account for
structural aspects of decision making in
criminal law. For instance, a direct question
about a suspect’s guilt (e.g., Eerland & Rassin,
2012; Englich et al. 2005), in probabilistic or
dichotomous format, might reveal that a piece
of evidence can impact a legal decision, but
does not capture the true legal issue, which is
the presence of reasonable doubt. This may
sound as a formality issue. However, research
on the framing effect suggests that semantics
are pivotal for decisions under uncertainty
(Belton, Thomson & Dhami, 2014; Englich, &
Mussweiler, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). Additionally, such findings say little
about the mechanism behind the decision.
Likewise, researchers only recently started to
consider that evidence interact and are
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weighted in combination with each other
(e.g., Lewisch, Mischkowski, & Glöckner,
2016; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014) and are yet to
address (but see Lagnado & Harvey, 2008)
that the presentation order is structured:
prosecutor before defence to maintain the
rule that the state must prove the guilt of the
suspect (as part of the presumption of
innocence). Therefore, experiments that do
not consider procedural order are seen as
having little to no meaning for judicial
decision-making in practice because they
deviated from the procedural framework.
Although legal psychologists are aware of
some of the problems surrounding those
structural aspects – using research material is
considered realistic, or prefer judicial experts
as subjects (i.e., Englich et al. 2005, De Keijser
& Van Koppen 2007) –, they appear not
sensitive to the fact that judicial decision-
making is strictly regulated. In fairness, there
are good reasons why researches strive for
simplicity in their designs including the need
to properly isolate independent variables, the
difficulty in recreating “authentic” legal
contexts, and concerns about the
generalizability of the findings beyond
specific jurisdictions. In fact, accounting for
the strict legal regulations can even be seen as
a detriment rather than an advantage,
because criminal justice systems vary greatly
across countries (Konečni & Ebbesen 1979;
Schuller & Ogloff 2001). Nevertheless, we are
of the opinion that it is better to produce
studies that are directly applicable to some
jurisdiction than to none.
Hence, we argue that the current field of legal
psychology can be categorized as psychology
and	 law or psychology in law, but not
psychology of	 law. To do so, legal,
psychological researchers should “tinker”
procedural rules to learn more about judicial
decision-making: accept the procedure on a
macro-level and tinker with procedural rules
on a micro-level. This approach is not without
its challenges as researchers need to juggle
internal validity and procedural/structural
aspects in their designs. Notwithstanding the
challenges, we believe that this approach can
transform research on legal decision making.
Way	Forward	
The methodological constraints and the
increased skepticism of experimental results
put the progress of decision-making in the
courtroom at a halt and frustrate legal experts
and decision-making researchers alike. The
only way forward is by building a culture of
collaboration and trust, fostering research
partnerships between legal scholars and
(legal) decision-making researchers.
Organizing common conferences, round
tables and think tanks for legal experts and
legal psychologists is a good start. Legal
scholars could inform researchers about
problems in practice and advise them on how
to best incorporate the procedural
framework in their methods. At the same
time, legal scholars, lawyers, and judges need
to open up to the idea that many of the
limitations of human cognition are universal
and independent of training or experience
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(Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011;
Thomas, & Lawrence, 2018). Importantly,
they need to open the door to their chambers
to researchers and facilitate in	vivo research.
Through their active involvement, they can
assist the researchers’ efforts in improving
court decision-making. Likewise, decision-
making experts should diversify their
research methods. They should strive to
design studies that make use of real judicial
data wherever possible and consider using
“representative design” (Dhami, & Belton,
2017; Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004) to
address some of the methodological concerns
raised by legal scholars. We feel strongly that
this collaborative approach will serve to
enrich and refine existing legal models of
judicial decision-making and contribute both
in psychological research and the legal
system.
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